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EVIDENCE
I. PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE APPLIED TO STATEMENTS MADE
TO MARRIAGE COUNSELOR
In Rivers v. Rivers' the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held the priest-penitent privilege2 applicable to communications
made to a minister in his capacity as a marriage counselor. A
minister cannot be compelled to disclose, in a legal or quasi-legal
proceeding, statements made to him during the course of a mar-
riage counseling session unless the speaker waives the privilege.
The case resulted from a dispute between the present and
former wives of Malcolm Rivers. Plaintiff Helen Rivers married
Malcolm in 1947; they were divorced in 1983. Shortly thereafter,
Malcolm married defendant Loretta Rivers. Helen then brought
an action against Loretta seeking damages for both alienation of
affection and criminal conversation. At trial, Helen admitted
that she and Malcolm had seen Dr. Paul Carlson, a marriage
counselor, before their divorce. Carlson holds a doctorate degree
in psychotherapy, is an ordained Methodist minister, and con-
ducts a marriage counseling program under the auspices of a Co-
lumbia church.3 When Loretta called Carlson to testify, he asked
to be excused because he believed his conversations with Helen
were confidential. Helen also objected to any testimony from
Carlson, arguing that her statements to him fell within the
priest-penitent privilege.4 The trial court excluded the proffered
1. 292 S.C. 21, 354 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. Section 19-11-90 of the South Carolina Code creates the priest-penitent privi-
lege. It reads:
In any legal or quasi-legal trial, hearing, or proceeding before any court, com-
mission or committee no regular or duly ordained minister, priest or rabbi shall
be required, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication
properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity and necessary and
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the
usual course of practice or discipline of his church or religious body. This pro-
hibition shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor it is made
waives the rights conferred.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
3. 292 S.C. at 25, 354 S.E.2d at 786.
4. Id.
1
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testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed.'
The priest-penitent privilege exists in South Carolina by
virtue of a 1959 statute. As the Rivers court noted, no compara-
ble privilege existed at common law. This case presents the first
detailed explanation of the scope of the privilege.7
The court identified four conditions that must be met
before the priest-penitent privilege may be invoked. There must
be: (1) a confidential communication; (2) the communication
must be disclosed to a regular or duly ordained minister, priest,
or rabbi; (3) the confidential communication must be entrusted
to the clergyman in his professional capacity; and (4) the confi-
dential communication must be one that is necessary and proper
to enable the clergyman to discharge the functions of his office
according to the usual course of practice or discipline of his
church or religious body." The burden of showing facts to estab-
lish the four conditions rests with the party seeking to invoke
the privilege.9
The court found the first two conditions to be readily ap-
parent from the facts. No one challenged Carlson's status as an
ordained clergyman, and the court concluded that Helen's com-
munications to Carlson were confidential.10 From an analytical
standpoint, this latter conclusion is interesting. Under the stat-
ute, the priest-penitent privilege belongs "to the party in whose
favor it is made."11 In the instant case, the privilege holder was
Helen. The court concluded, however, that the communications
were confidential because Carlson, the minister, so considered
5. The court also addressed two other issues raised by the appeal. It rejected
Loretta's argument that Helen's recovery on both her claim for alienation of affections
and her claim for criminal conversation constituted double recovery for the same injury.
While admitting that both causes of action are "closely related," the court held that each
is a "separate [cause] of action, [having] its own peculiar elements." Id. at 29, 354 S.E.2d
at 788. The court also rejected Loretta's contention that the damage awards were
excessive.
6. See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
7. Even though the statute creating the privilege passed the General Assembly in
1959, the issue has been the subject of only one other appellate decision. See State v.
Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 226 S.E.2d 896 (1976).
8. 292 S.C. at 26, 354 S.E.2d at 787.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 27, 354 S.E.2d at 787.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Because the statute allows the
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them. Without enumerating the factors establishing confidenti-
ality, the court implied that it has both subjective and objective
components: the clergyman must subjectively believe the com-
munication to be confidential, and his subjective belief must be
reasonable under the circumstances.12 Because Carlson demon-
strated, by his request to be excused, that he believed the state-
ments made by Helen to him during counseling were confiden-
tial and because the court found his belief reasonable, Helen's
statements met the test of confidentiality.13
While the facts established the first two conditions neces-
sary to invoke the priest-penitent privilege, the court found the
other conditions problematic. In addition to requiring a confi-
dential communication to a clergyman, the statute requires that
the communication be made to a clergyman in his professional
capacity. Though marriage counseling might not fall within the
popular conception of ministerial duties, the court noted that
decisions made by husbands and wives regarding their marriages
often involve spiritual considerations.14 It analogized marriage
counseling to other situations, such as draft counseling, in which
ministerial advice might be sought outside the realm of doctrinal
guidance. 5 Furthermore, while admitting that Dr. Carlson
served in a dual capacity as therapist and minister, the court
was reluctant to delve into the counselor-counselee relationship
to draw lines between the counseling and the spiritual guidance
Helen received. The practical difficulty in segregating Carlson's
roles as counselor and clergyman, the court concluded, required
that all statements Helen made to him be deemed within the
scope of his ministerial office. 6
Finally, the court concluded that Helen's statements to
Carlson enabled him to "discharge a function of his office ac-
12. The court's langauge is cryptic, at best. "Dr. Carlson considered Helen's com-
munications to him to be confidential, as do we." 292 S.C. at 27, 354 S.E.2d at 787.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (because draft regis-
trants must make decisions that involve spiritual and moral considerations, draft coun-
seling services performed by a minister are performed in the course of his function as a
clergyman).
16. At least one other court has reached the same conclusion, albeit in a different
setting. See State v. Jackson, 77 N.C. App. 832, 336 S.E.2d 437 (1985) (because of impos-
sibility of determining extent to which criminal defendant confided in his aunt as a min-
ister instead of as a relative, court deemed statement was made to a minister).
1988]
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cording to the usual course of practice of his church."'11 The
court was reluctant, as it was in determining the scope of Carl-
son's professional capacity, to drawn any boundaries around
"the usual course of practice of [the] church." Since Carlson's
church made marriage counseling available to the public at
large, regardless of church affiliation,' the counseling services
were part of the usual course of church practice. Notably, the
court did not examine the tenets of the Methodist faith in de-
lineating the boundaries of church practice. Under Rivers, as
long as a church maintains a counseling program, it matters not
whether such a program is required by the doctrine of a particu-
lar faith. The proper inquiry is whether the counseling program
normally is offered by the local church. Statements by couples
made to a minister while they are participating in one of these
programs are within the usual course of church practice for the
purposes of the priest-penitent privilege.
Rivers aligns South Carolina with several other jurisdictions
that apply the priest-penitent privilege to marriage counseling
sessions. Although the cases arising under statutes similar to
South Carolina's are split, 9 the more recent decisions have held
marriage counseling sessions to be within the scope of the privi-
lege.20 In addition, a number of state legislatures have amended
their relevant statutes to cover statements made to ministers in
conjunction with marriage counseling.2
17. 292 S.C. at 28, 354 S.E.2d at 788.
18. Id.
19. See Annotation, Communication to Clergyman as Privileged, 71 A.L.R.3D 794,
817-20 (1976). At least two courts have rejected the contention that the priest-penitent
privilege applies to marriage counseling sessions. In Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d
90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965), the court stated in dictum that California's priest-penitent
privilege statute was drawn too narrowly to apply to marriage counseling sessions. In In
re Estate of Schaeffer, 52 Dauph. Co. Rep. 45 (Pa. County Ct. 1941), the court refused to
exclude a minister's testimony regarding statements made during a marriage counseling
session because they were neither penitential in character nor made in the solicitation of
spiritual advice. This case was decided before Pennsylvania passed a statute creating the
priest-penitent privilege. Since then, at least one Pennsylvania trial court has applied
the privilege to marriage counseling sessions. See LeGore v. LeGore, 5 Adams L.J. 51, 31
Pa. D. & C.2d (1963).
20. See Pardie v. Pardie, 158 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1968); Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29
Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961), appeal dismissed, 16 A.D.2d 735,
226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962); Spencer v. Spencer, 61 N.C. App. 535, 301 S.E.2d 411 (1983);
LeGore v. LeGore, 5 Adams L.J. 51, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 107 (1963).
21. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(b)(3) (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309(3) (1981); Mo.
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The court's conclusion in Rivers is founded on a sound stat-
utory basis. Particularly praiseworthy is the court's refusal to
ferret out the advice given by Carlson solely as a counselor. Be-
cause of the inextricable link between Carlson's roles as a spiri-
tual and secular advisor, any attempt by the court to define the
scope of Carlson's ministry or the "usual course of practice" of
his church would have entangled the judiciary in a matter that is
generally religious in nature. The court wisely avoided that
pitfall.
If, however, Rivers conclusively establishes the applicability
of the priest-penitent privilege to marriage counseling sessions
conducted by a minister, it should not be taken as the final word
on the subject. At least two other issues will need resolution in
this area, either by the courts or the General Assembly. First,
Rivers does not address those situations in which the counselee
fails to object to the minister's testimony. The question remains
whether, in these instances, a waiver will be implied from the
counselee's silence. Since in Rivers both the minister and the
counselee objected, it was clear that the counselee did not intend
to waive the privilege.
A related, unanswered question is whether silence will imply
a waiver even when the minister objects to the testimony. There
has been some discussion in another jurisdiction regarding what
constitutes a waiver. In Kruglikov v. Kruglikov22 the New York
Supreme Court excused a rabbi, after he had raised the privilege
issue, from testifying about a counseling session. The counselee
had not objected to the testimony, but the court sustained the
rabbi's objection in the absence of an express waiver by the
counselee 2 3 The New York court apparently would not imply a
waiver, at least when the minister had objected.
The South Carolina statute stipulates that the privilege
"shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor it is
made waives the rights conferred." '24 This language, coupled
with the burden placed on the counselee to show facts establish-
22. 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1961), appeal dismissed, 16 A.D.2d 735, 226
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962).
23. 29 Misc. 2d at 18, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
19881 EVIDENCE
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ing the privilege, 25 appears to place the burden of raising the
objection on the counselee. Whether South Carolina courts will
require that the waiver be express, as New York apparently has
done, or will imply it from the counselee's failure to raise the
objection, is uncertain.
Finally, Rivers creates an inconsistency in South Carolina
evidence law. While statements made in marriage counseling
sessions with ministers now fall under a recognized evidentiary
privilege, a similar privilege does not extend to those who seek
the services of "secular" marriage counselors. South Carolina
does not recognize a physician-patient privilege or general coun-
selor-counselee privilege that would cover statements made to a
psychiatrist or psychologist during a marriage counseling ses-
sion. 26 Though there may be some historical basis for distin-
guishing between statements made to a minister and statements
made to a physician or counselor, that distinction is rooted in
the substance of the communication and the sanctity of the dis-
cussion. While the burdens of one's conscience may be more
worthy of confidentiality than the details of one's physical ail-
ments, the distinction breaks down in the context of marriage
counseling. The substance of statements made to the minister as
marriage counselor and the substance of statements made to the
psychiatrist or psychologist as marriage counselor may be identi-
cal or have great overlap. Furthermore, the counselee's expecta-
tion of privacy is identical in both situations. After Rivers, how-
ever, a statement made in a marriage counseling session will or
will not be privileged solely on the basis of the counselor's pro-
fessional title. If the counselor is a minister, the statement is
excluded; if the counselor is a psychiatrist or psychologist, the
statement must be admitted in the absence of some other evi-
dentiary rule that would compel its exclusion. This is, to say the
least, an illogical result.
Despite the inconsistency created by the Rivers holding, the
decision to apply the priest-penitent privilege to statements
made to a minister in his capacity as a marriage counselor is a
good one. Because the privilege is statutorily created, however,
the South Carolina courts may be reluctant to recognize an anal-
25. 292 S.C. at 26, 354 S.E.2d at 787.
26. See Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 232 S.C. 274, 101 S.E.2d 821 (1958);
Aakjer v. Spagnoli, 291 S.C. 165, 352 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1987).
[Vol. 40
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ogous common law privilege for other marriage counselors. If the
courts, as a matter of judicial restraint, cannot act, then the
General Assembly must grapple with the inconsistency. Perhaps
Rivers will provide the necessary impetus for resolution of these
matters.
William L. Monts, III
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY OF COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
EXHIBITED BY SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN HELD INADMISSIBLE
In State v. Hudnal127 the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed a trial court decision that admitted expert testimony con-
cerning common characteristics exhibited by sexually abused
children.28 The court held that this evidence was inadmissible
"to bolster the child's testimony that the crime had in fact oc-
curred and was not offered to explain any seemingly inconsistent
response to the trauma.
'29
Michael Lee Hudnall was convicted on two counts of first
degree criminal sexual conduct. The victim was his three-year-
old daughter.30 Following a domestic dispute that ultimately en-
ded her marriage to Michael Hudnall, Mrs. Hudnal reported
the sexual abuse. 1
The State offered a pediatrician's testimony regarding com-
mon characteristics that child sexual abuse victims exhibit, in-
cluding sexual behavior with others, nightmares, and masturba-
27. 293 S.C. 97, 359 S.E.2d 59 (1987).
28. These common characteristics sometimes are referred to as the "sexually
abused child syndrome." For a discussion of the difference between syndrome evidence
and testimony of common characteristics of abused children, see McCord, Expert Psy-
chological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A
Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CraM. L. & CRIhi-
NOLOGY 53 (1986).
29. 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 62.
30. Because the victim was three years old at the time of trial, her testimony was
taken by videotaped deposition. The supreme court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in qualifying her, concluding after reviewing the videotape that the victim
could not be held morally accountable for telling a lie. 293 S.C. at 99, 359 S.E.2d at 61.
For a discussion of the test to determine a minor's competence to testify, see State v.
Green, 267 S.C. 599, 230 S.E.2d 618 (1976).
31. Mrs. Hudnall contacted a lawyer regarding the alleged incident but did not
take the child for a medical examination until the Department of Social Services became
involved in the case. The medical examination did not indicate any physical abnormali-
ties to corroborate the allegations. 293 S.C. at 98-99, 359 S.E.2d at 60-61.
1988]
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tion.2 Hudnall argued that this evidence had "no probative
value to establish an element of the crime.
'33
The court distinguished State v. Hill,34 which allowed testi-
mony of the "battered woman's syndrome" to show that the
crime had actually occurred. 5 The court also noted that cases
from other jurisdictions were consistent in applying this distinc-
tion when determining whether to admit or refuse evidence of
this type. Finally, the court noted that other courts that have
admitted this type of evidence have allowed it only to explain a
child victim's post-trauma behavior as a common reaction to
sexual abuse when that behavior would otherwise appear
impeaching.
3 7
This is an issue of first impression in South Carolina, and
its analysis is based on a test similar to that used under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 8 In South Carolina, expert testimony
may be admissible if it "will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ' 39 Courts that have
considered the introduction of this type of evidence in child sex-
ual assault cases have almost unanimously recognized its value
in assisting the jury to understand the evidence.40 Since the
unique psychological effects of sexual assault on children place
32. Id. at 99, 359 S.E.2d at 61.
33. Id.
34. 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986) (battered woman's syndrome evidence held
admissible to explain the psychological feasibility of the defendant's claim of self-defense
in view of seemingly inconsistent behavior).
35. 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 61; see also Evidence, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 39 S.C.L. REV. 89 (1987).
36. The court specifically noted People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome held inad-
missible when used to show that the rape had in fact occurred); People v. Pullins, 145
Mich. App. 414, 378 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (rape trauma syndrome not reliable scientific
evidence); and Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1986) (sexual abuse ac-
commodation syndrome not reliable to prove abuse occurred).
37. 293 S.C. at 100, 359 S.E.2d at 61-62 (1987). See Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570,
688 P.2d 326 (1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State v. Dale,
75 Or. App. 453, 706 P.2d 1009 (1985).
38. See IV. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW (1976).
39. FED. R. EVID. 702.
40. See, e.g., State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 473-74, 720 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1986);
State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 607-608, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982); State v. Middleton, 294
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the average juror at a disadvantage in understanding the vic-
tim's behavior, the majority of courts have concluded that it is
within the trial court's discretion to admit such evidence in ap-
propriate circumstances.41 It is at this point, however, that the
authorities differ. Some courts allow the expert to testify that he
believed the child's story and that the child exhibited character-
istics common to sexually abused children.4 Other courts limit
expert testimony of these common characteristics to the expla-
nation of apparently bizarre behavior.43
It appears that the supreme court has joined the majority
view by excluding this type evidence when used as proof of the
occurrence of the abuse." As with most opinions on this issue,
however, the rationale is not completely clear. The court rea-
soned that "the evidence was admitted to bolster the child's tes-
timony that the crime had in fact occurred and was not offered
to explain any seemingly inconsistent response to the trauma.
4
This rationale most commonly translates into a belief that the
evidence may unduly influence the jury's judgment with regard
to the truthfulness of the child.46 As noted in State v. Middle-
ton,47 however, one can argue that the testimony does not invade
the province of the jury because the jury is not bound by the
expert testimony; the trier of fact alone makes the ultimate
decision.48
41. State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. at _ 534 A.2d at 187. See also State v. Geyman,
729 P.2d 475, 479 (Mont. 1986); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. at 572-73, 688 P.2d at 327;
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa. Super. 368, 374-79, 502 A.2d 253, 257-58 (1985).
42. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
43. Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326. See also Comment, The Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV.
175 (1986). Examples of bizarre behavior include retraction of the allegations or extreme
delay in reporting the alleged sexual abuse.
44. See generally McCord, supra note 28, at 12-17; State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. at
, 534 A.2d at 187-88.
45. 293 S.C. at 100, 188 S.E.2d at 62.
46. See State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. at -, 534 A.2d at 188 (1987); Roe, Expert Tes-
timony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97 (1985); Comment, The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 175 (1986).
47. 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
48. Id. at 435, 657 P.2d at 1219. See also Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibil-
ity, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psy-
chological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985) (suggests that expert psychological
testimony cannot invade the province of the jury unless the jury is instructed that it
must agree with the expert's assessment).
1988]
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While it seems clear from Hudnall that expert testimony
concerning common characteristics of sexually abused children
will not be allowed unless used to explain some seemingly incon-
sistent actions of the victim, 49 the extent to which expert testi-
mony will be allowed in those cases in which there is inconsis-
tent victim behavior remains unresolved.50 It logically follows
from this decision that testimony in those cases would be lim-
ited to the issue of the common characteristics of abused chil-
dren. The expert would not be allowed to testify in any manner
that could be construed to bolster the credibility of the victim.
Although it is understandable in cases of this type"' that the
court would be reluctant to allow the prosecution to make its
case by use of subjective expert testimony, some expert testi-
mony may be useful. The expert could explain behavior incon-
sistent with behavior that the common juror might expect from
an abused child. This would thereby strike a balance between
the defendant's interest in having the jury determine the facts
and credibility of the witnesses and the prosecutor's interest in
having the jury understand the nature of the case.
Mark C. Dukes
III. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
POSSESSION OF COCAINE NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT
In State v. Ball52 the South Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether possession of cocaine constitutes a
crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of impeachment.
In holding that it is not, the court clearly distinguished, for pur-
poses of impeachment, crimes involving simple possession of an
illegal narcotic from those involving possession with intent to
49. An exception may be when the victim's credibility is put into issue. See Mc-
Cord, supra note 28, at 41-42 n. 217.
50. In State v. Rogers, 293 S.C. 505, 362 S.E.2d 7 (1987), the supreme court reaf-
firmed Hudnall, holding that admission of evidence of behavioral traits of a child who
has been sexually abused is erroneous if there is no evidence that the child responded in
a seemingly inconsistent fashion after the alleged sexual abuse.
51. Proof of the crime can be difficult; there is sometimes no physical evidence of
abuse, and reports of sexual abuse are often made during a separation or divorce. See,
e.g., Hudnall, 293 S.C. at 98-99, 359 S.E.2d at 60-61; State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366,
534 A.2d 184, 186 (1987).
52. 292 S.C. 71, 354 S.E.2d 906 (1987).
[Vol. 40
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In South Carolina, evidence of a prior conviction is admissi-
ble for purposes of impeachment of a witness when the prior
conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude." The court
has defined moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to
his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.""'
In a long line of cases, the South Carolina courts have addressed
the issue of crimes involving moral turpitude.5
The supreme court previously has discussed moral turpi-
tude with respect to crimes involving possession of marijuana
and possession with intent to sell marijuana. In State v. Lilly56
the supreme court held that the crime of possession of mari-
juana with intent to sell or distribute is admissible for purposes
of impeachment. The court in Lilly distinguished possession
with intent to sell marijuana from mere possession.5 7 In an ear-
lier case, State v. Harvey,5 8 the court had held that simple pos-
session of marijuana was not a crime concerning moral turpi-
tude. The court reasoned in Lilly that an intent to distribute
involved the breach of a "duty which a person owes to other
people and to society in general" and, therefore, rose to the level
of moral turpitude."'
In State v. Ball the court convicted the appellant of shop-
lifting. At trial, one eyewitness testified that the appellant had
shoplifted three pairs of blue jeans by taking them off the rack,
rolling them up, and dropping them in an accomplice's shopping
bag. The appellant then testified that she had only handed the
53. See State v. Morris, 289 S.C. 294, 345 S.E.2d 477 (1986); State v. Yates, 280
S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), vacated, 474 U.S. 896 (1985); State v. Millings, 247 S.C.
52, 145 S.E.2d 422 (1965).
54. State v. Morris, 289 S.C. at 296, 345 S.E.2d at 478 (quoting State v. Yates, 280
S.C. at 37, 310 S.E.2d at 810).
55. See State v. McFarlane, 279 S.C. 327, 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983) (criminal sexual
conduct with a minor); State v. Lilly, 278 S.C. 499, 299 S.E.2d 329 (1983) (sale of mari-
juana); State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982) (arson); State v. Jones 271 S.C.
287, 247 S.E.2d 43 (1978) (assault with intent to rape); State v. Horton, 271 S.C. 413, 248
S.E.2d 263 (1978) ("hit and run" accident); State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 232 S.E.2d
328 (1977) (housebreaking and grand larceny).
56. 278 S.C. 499, 299 S.E.2d 329 (1983).
57. Id. at 500, 299 S.E.2d at 330.
58. 275 S.C. 225, 268 S.E.2d 587 (1981).
59. 278 S.C. at 500, 299 S.E.2d at 330.
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jeans over as requested and had no knowledge of what her com-
panion did with the jeans. Because the defendant testified on
her own behalf, evidence of prior convictions regarding moral
turpitude was admissible for purposes of impeachment.
The trial court allowed the prosecution to question the de-
fendant regarding her prior conviction for possession of cocaine.
In overruling the lower court, the supreme court stated that
"[p]ossession of cocaine, like possession of marijuana, relates
more to self-destructive behavior than to the defendant's duty
to other people or to society in general."6 0 Thus, the court held
that such evidence was not admissible for purposes of impeach-
ment." Because the defendant-witness's credibility was a critical
factor for the jury's determination, the court held the error in
admitting the impeachment evidence was not harmless and re-
manded the case for a new trial.2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gregory reasoned that
possession of cocaine fostered illicit manufacturing and traffick-
ing of the drug and that its habitual use resulted in the perpe-
tration of other crimes. Thus, in view of society's interest in dis-
couraging drug abuse, possession of cocaine should be
considered a crime involving moral turpitude."3
The majority's position, however, is in line with the conclu-
sions of other states concerning drug-related crimes. For exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court recently addressed this issue
in People v. Castro.6 4 In Castro the state supreme court held
that the defendant should not have been impeached with a prior
conviction for simple possession of heroin. On the other hand,
the court noted that possession for sale would have been admis-
sible since that constituted moral turpitude based on the inher-
ent intent to corrupt others.6 5 Similarly, Georgia deliberated the
question of whether the illegal sale of a narcotic constituted
moral turpitude, for purposes of impeachment, in State v.
Lewis. e6 Relying on "common knowledge" of the harmful effects
that the sale of cocaine inflicts on our society, the court held
60. 292 S.C. at 74, 354 S.E.2d at 98.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 75, 354 S.E.2d at 909 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
64. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
65. Id. at 317, 696 P.2d at 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
66. 243 Ga. 443, 254 S.E.2d 830 (1979).
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that the sale of illegal drugs is a breach of man's duty to man
and, thus, a crime involving moral turpitude."7
In summary, State v. Ball reinforces a line of cases concern-
ing impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction for a drug-
related offense. Whether such a crime will be considered a crime
involving moral turpitude will hinge on whether there is a
breach of duty to society in general. Therefore, crimes involving
simple possession of an illegal narcotic, harming only the indi-
vidual, do not constitute moral turpitude, whereas crimes in-
cluding an intent to sell the narcotic do rise to that level because
others' interests are at stake.
Barbara E. Brunson
IV. COURT REFUSES TO CREATE HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
In South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Doe",
the South Carolina Court of Appeals faced a problem that is
plaguing society - child sexual abuse. An alarming number of
child sexual abuse cases are reported each year in this county,
and the numbers seem to be growing steadily." Child molesters
fit no particular stereotype, 0 and a large proportion of child mo-
lesters are friends or family members of the victim.7 1 Sexual as-
67. Id. at 447, 254 S.E.2d at 832.
68. 292 S.C. 211, 355 S.E.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1987).
69. Some statistics show a 200% increase in the number of child abuse cases re-
ported nationally since 1976. Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay State-
ments on Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1745 n.7 (1983) (citing Collins,
Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at
C1, col. 1). Some estimates put the total number of annual sexual abuse cases as high as
500,000. Comment, Television Trials and Fundamental Fairness: The Constitutionality
of Louisiana's Child Shield Law, 61 TuL. L. REV. 141, 141 n.2 (1986) (citing Schultz, The
Child Sex Victim: Social, Psychological and Legal Perspective, 52 CHILD WELFARE 147,
148 (1973)).
70. "Molesters cut across economic, social, ethnic, and educational lines. They may
be rich or poor, well-educated or ignorant, blue-collar or white, married or single." Note,
Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Exception and the
Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1021, 1021 n.2 (1985) (citing The Child Mo-
lester: No "Profile," L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, § 1, col. 1.).
71. "Of 583 cases of child sex abuse examined in one survey, the offender was a
family member in 47% of the cases, otherwise an acquaintance of the child in 42%, and
a stranger in only 8%." Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecu-
tions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 n.14 (1985) (citing Conte &
Berliner, Sexual Abuse of Children: Implications for Practice, J. CONTMP. Soc. WORK
19881
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saults on children usually take place in homes and kindergar-
tens, not on street corners and in dark alleys. 2 The appalling
aspect of this social problem is its grossly low percentage of re-
ported cases. 3 Since the offense very often is committed by an
authoritarian figure, the child may not report the incident for
fear of the defendant or of punishment 4 or because the child
sees the act as an extension of the molester's authority.
75
Of the small percentage of child abuse cases that are re-
ported, all are very difficult to prosecute, and only a small per-
centage result in convictions. As a rule, the victim is the only
witness to the crime.7 Although the South Carolina Supreme
Court has held that a child may be competent to testify at
trial, 7 7 a child may be easily confused on cross-examination by
an experienced defense attorney.78 It is important to remember
601, 603 (1981)).
72. A Bethesda, Maryland man was charged with sexual offenses against six boys,
ages 6 to 11, in his neighborhood. Man Charged in Sex Cases Had 2 Prior Convictions,
Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 1. At a military-operated day-care center for 130
children of military and civilian personnel at the United States Military Academy, child
sexual abuse charges were investigated. Scandal Jolts West Point, Wash. Post, Oct. 16,
1984, at Al, col. 1. Operators of County-wide Babysitting Service in Miami, Florida were
charged with 10 counts of sexual battery on children under 11. Guilt Haunts Molested
Kids' Parents, USA Today, Sept. 17, 1984, at 11A, col. 2. Seven teachers at one Califor-
nia preschool have been charged with 208 counts of sexual abuse. What Price Day Care?,
Newsweek, Sept. 10, 1984, at 19. All articles are cited in Note, supra note 70, at 1022-23
n.5.
73. In two out of three cases, the child never reports the abusive act. Note, supra
note 71, at 806 n.7 (citing D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 106 (1979) (cit-
ing survey results)).
74. People v. Davison, 12 Mich. App. 429, 163 N.W.2d 10 (1968). A nine-year-old
child, the subject of sex abuse, said nothing to anyone about the incident for two weeks
because of her fear of the defendant.
75. Note, supra note 70, at 1024 (citing DeJong, Hervada, & Emmett, Epidemio-
logic Variations in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 155, 161
(1983)).
76. Stevens & Berliner, Special Technique for Child Witnesses, THE SEXUAL VIc-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, 248 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
77. State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987) (three-year-old held to be
competent witness).
78. An example of this situation is as follows:
At the trial of Robert and Louis Bentz, accused of participating with 22 other
adults and one teenager in two child sex abuse rings in the small town of Jor-
dan, Minnesota, "[t]he defense team relied on traditional courtroom tactics to
shake the children's stories and weaken their credibility with the jury. They
badgered them in an effort to confuse them about dates and places. They ac-
cused them of lying and leaped onto the least inconsistency." The Bentzes
were acquitted on all counts.
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that ours is an adversarial system of justice. Since the adver-
sarial system extends to child abuse cases, the child is often a
victim twice - once during the sexual abuse and again on the
witness stand.
Although the South Carolina courts have allowed special ar-
rangements for a child witness in a child sexual abuse case,19 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals refused to create a child abuse
exception to the hearsay evidence rule in South Carolina De-
partment of Social Services v. Doe.80 In Doe, the Department
alleged that a father had "sexually abused his three and a half
year old daughter by performing oral sex on her and fondling
her genital area.""1 The family court judge ruled in limine that
statements made by the child to third parties were admissible as
evidence, and on the strength of such hearsay evidence, the
court entered an order finding that the father had abused the
child."2 The child allegedly made these statements to third par-
ties while in the midst of a "custody dispute incident to her par-
ents' divorce."' 3 The Department conceded that the child's
statements, made while in her mother's custody, were influenced
by her mother and grandmother. 4
In reversing the family court, the court of appeals refused to
create a child abuse exception to the hearsay evidence rule. In so
doing, the court relied heavily on the Pennsylvania case of Com-
monwealth v. Haber85 and followed the so-called majority rule.8
Note, supra note 71, at 807 n.12 (citing N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 4, at 8, col. 1.).
79. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987) (child's testimony
may be videotaped out of presence of defendant and jury); State v. Hale, 284 S.C. 348,
326 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1985) (leading questions allowed when child is a witness);
O'Neill v. Cooper, 282 S.C. 275, 317 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1984) (trial judge has discretion
to exclude the adverse party when the child is testifying).
80. 292 S.C. 211, 355 S.E.2d 543.
81. Id. at 212, 355 S.E.2d at 544.
82. Id. at 213, 355 S.E.2d at 544.
83. Id. at 216, 355 S.E.2d at 546.
84. Id. at 217, 355 S.E.2d at 546.
85. 351 Pa. Super. 79, 505 A.2d 273 (1986). Testimony of the victims' mothers con-
cerning what their children told them was inadmissable hearsay. The court refused to
create a child abuse exception to the hearsay- evidence rule.
86. The court of appeals, citing Haber, pointed out the following:
[Tlhirty-three states and the federal courts have codified their rules of evi-
dence in recent years .... None of them includes a "child sexual abuse" ex-
ception. Among the seventeen remaining states which retain common law rules
of evidence, none has created a common law exception for out of court state-
ments of children in sexual abuse cases.
1988]
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The court also noted that no major treatise on evidence recog-
nizes such an exception. 7 It does not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that because the holding in Doe follows the majority rule,
it is a good decision. The court, ruling on a very fact-specific
case, laid down a blanket rule and refused to create a hearsay
exception in any child sexual abuse case.
A better alternative to the total prohibition of the child
abuse exception is a "totality of the circumstances balancing
test" promoted by dissenting Judge Olszewski in Haber."' In
such a test of admissibility, the court, in an in camera hearing,
would determine whether the hearsay evidence was necessary
and trustworthy."' In determining the probability of trustworthi-
ness of the testimony, the judge would consider the following:
the totality of the circumstances, including: the time, content,
and context of the statement; the language used by the child;
the age and maturity of the child; the nature and duration of
the abuse; the relationship of the child to the offender; and any
other factor relevant to the case."'
Using such a balancing test, the court likely would not have ad-
mitted the hearsay in Doe because of the evidence of "coaching"
on the part of the victim's mother and grandmother. The court
correctly held the hearsay inadmissible but, in so doing, used a
harsh and ineffective test.
01szewski's dissent is of particular importance to South
Carolina lawyers because of an act that became effective subse-
quent to the decision in Doe. Governor Campbell signed the act
into effect on June 3, 1988.11 The act, like Olszewski's dissent,
292 S.C. at 215-16, 355 S.E.2d at 545-46.
87. Id. at 216, 355 S.E.2d at 546.
88. 351 Pa. Super. 79, 505 A.2d 273.
89. The two major principles underlying the development of any hearsay exception
are the necessity for the evidence and the circumstantial probability of its trustworthi-
ness. See 5 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 251 (rev. ed.
1974).
90. 351 Pa. Super. at 94, 505 A.2d at 281-82 (Olszewski, J., dissenting).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). The act reads:
(A) An out-of-court statement made by a child under twelve years of age
at the time of the family court proceeding brought pursuant to Section 20-7-
610 or Section 20-7-736 concerning an act of abuse or neglect as defined by
Section 20-7-490 that is not otherwise admissible in evidence is admissible in
the family court proceeding if the requirements of this section are met.
(B) An out-of-court statement may be admitted as provided in subsection
[Vol. 40
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would not have allowed the hearsay in Doe because of the ad-
(A) if:
(1) The child testifies at the proceeding or testifies by means of videotaped
deposition or closed-circuit television, and at the time of the testimony the
child is subject to cross-examination about the statement; or
(2) (a) The child is found by the court to be unavailable to testify on any
of these grounds:
(i) the child's death;
(ii) the child's physical or mental disability;
(iii) the existence of a privilege involving the child;
(iv) the child's incompetency, including the child's inability to communi-
cate about the offense because of fear;
(v) substantial likelihood that the child would suffer severe emotional
trauma from testifying at the proceeding or by means of videotaped deposition
or closed-circuit television; and
(b) The child's out-of-court statement is shown to possess particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.
(C) The proponent of the statement shall inform the adverse party of the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the content of the statement
sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to provide the defendant with a fair
opportunity to prepare a response to the statement before the proceeding at
which it is offered.
(D) In determining whether a statement possesses particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness under subsection (B)(2)(b), the court may consider, but
is not limited to, the following factors:
(1) the child's personal knowledge of the event;
(2) the age and maturity of the child;
(3) certainty that the statement was made, including the credibility of the
person testifying about the statement;
(4) any apparent motive the child may have to falsify or distort the event,
including bias, corruption, or coercion;
(5) whether more than one person heard the statement;
(6) whether the child was suffering pain or distress when making the
statement;
(7) the nature and duration of any alleged abuse;
(8) whether the child's young age makes it unlikely that the child
fabricated a statement that represents a graphic, detailed account beyond the
child's knowledge and experience;
(9) whether the statement has a ring of verity, has internal consistency or
coherence, and uses terminology appropriate to the child's age;
(10) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant's opportunity
to commit the act complained of in the child's statement;
(E) The court shall support with findings on the record any rulings per-
taining to the child's unavailability and the trustworthiness of the out-of-court
statement.
(F) Any hearsay testimony admissible under this section shall not be ad-
missible in any other proceeding.
(G) If the parents of the child are separated or divorced, the hearsay state-
ment shall be inadmissible if (1) one of the parents is the alleged perpetrator
of the alleged abuse or neglect and (2) the allegation was made after the par-
ties separated or divorced.
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missions of coaching. The act, however, should prove to be a tre-
mendous asset in the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases
while, at the same time, providing the necessary constitutional
protections to the defendant. Although the Doe court stated that
it was not persuaded by the fact that some legislatures have en-
acted statutes permitting hearsay evidence in child sexual abuse
cases,92 twenty-two states have enacted such legislation." South
Carolina now has followed this national trend.
The act provides for the admission of hearsay only when
necessary and only when the trial court determines the probable
trustworthiness of the hearsay. The hearsay is available only if
the child testifies or is unable to testify. The in camera hearing
conducted with the child in judge's chambers and in the pres-
ence of both attorneys would determine the probability of trust-
worthiness of the child's statements. Evidence would be
presented to the judge so that he could balance the "totality of
the circumstances" of any particular situation. Unlike the rigid
prohibition laid down in Doe, which failed to take into account
the welfare of the young victim, this act provides a fair and flexi-
ble means of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.
This act surely will face a constitutional challenge under the
sixth amendment's94 confrontation clause.9 5 Defense attorneys
92. 292 S.C. at 216, 355 S.E.2d at 546.
93. ALASIKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1987); AmZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp.
1987); CAL. EViD. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987);
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (1979 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-18(Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1988) (civil); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)
(criminal); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE §
232.96(6) (1985 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.156 (West Supp.
1988) (civil); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West Supp. 1988) (criminal); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 491.075 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 65.00 to 65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp. 1988); RIL GEN. LAWS § 14-1-68 (Supp.
1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); TEx. CrIaM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072
(Vernon Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988); ARK. R. Evm.
803(25)(A); VT. R. EVID. § 804a.
94. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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will argue that without cross-examination of the child, there will
be no way to test the truth of the victim's statement.9 6
It is possible, however, that the act can withstand such a
constitutional challenge. The act calls for the child to testify and
to be subject to cross-examination if he or she is available, and if
the child is unavailable, the hearsay is admissible only after an
in camera determination by the judge. The counsel for the de-
fense is present at this in camera hearing. If the defense coun-
sel's presence in cross-examining a videotaped child satisfies the
requirements of the confrontation clause,97 then, arguably, de-
fense counsel's presence at an in camera hearing will satisfy
such requirements. Additionally, the defense counsel is free to
cross-examine the third party as to the truth of the hearsay
evidence.
While the South Carolina Court of Appeals refused to cre-
ate a child abuse exception to the hearsay evidence rule in Doe,
95. The United States Supreme Court held in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988),
that criminal defendants are guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the United States
Constitution a "face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
Id. at 2800. Arguably, § 19-1-180 of the South Carolina Code may be violative of the
confrontation clause in that it may deny a criminal defendant this "face-to-face meet-
ing." On the other hand, the logical extension of such an argument would be that all of
the exceptions to the prohibition against hearsay evidence would be unconstitutional.
Additionally, under the South Carolina act, the defendant would have face-to-face con-
tact with the "witness testifying before the trier of fact"; however, since the child victim
would not be a witness at the trial, there would be no right for the defendant to have a
face-to-face confrontation with the victim.
The opinion in Coy may cast doubt on cases such as State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351,
353 S.E.2d 451 (1987), which permitted a child's testimony to be videotaped out of the
presence of the defendant and the jury. Justice O'Connor, however, joined by Justice
White, wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that the confrontation clause issue
should be decided by using a balancing test approach on a case-by-case basis:
I would permit use of a particular trial procedure that called for something
other than face-to-face confrontation if that procedure was necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy. The protection of child witnesses is, in my
view and in the view of a substantial majority of the States, just such a policy.
The primary focus therefore likely will be on the necessity prong.
108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, it seems impossible to determine
whether the South Carolina act would pass constitutional muster. It does seem certain,
however, that such a constitutional challenge soon will be made.
96. Cross-examination has been characterized as the "'greatest engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth.'" State v. Williams, 285 S.C. 544, 548 n.1, 331 S.E.2d
354, 356 n.1 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Younger, An Irreverent Introduction to Hearsay 2
(ABA Litigation Monograph No. 3, 1977)).
97. See State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
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the South Carolina Legislature may have greatly altered the
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases by enacting section 19-1-
180 of the South Carolina Code.
Luther C. Kissam, IV
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